‘Every weapon ever invented has been used in anger’ is a cliché surprsingly hard to refute. Albeit that there is one weapon that has only been used ‘in anger’ just twice - the atomic bomb. So of the successful and unsuccessful weapons systems used over millennia, the nuclear option has only been used two times, and even then, only against an enemy who did not possessit itself. Arguably, great power possession of nuclear weapons has done more to ensure no true intra-great power war since 1945 than any one other factor.
Currently the USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France are the public Big Five, with, to differing degrees, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea all being more or less open about their capacity. Infamously, Iran is believed to be actively engaged in acquiring the capability with rather more gusto than it turns out Saddam’s Iraq was. Indeed, it has been reported that any physics student could access the information to build such a weapon. Hence nuclear weapons will not be uninvented. Reductions through arms limitation treaties have had some success in limiting overall numbers of warheads but not in preventing individual nations acquiring them. Furthermore, international non-proliferation treaties have not prevented nations outside the Big Five from acquiring actual weapons and the various methods for short and long range delivery. All of which indicates that nuclear WMD are here to stay for the foreseeable future and it is against this background that the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent must be measured.
However, a question that might be addressed is why nuclear weapons have only been used ‘in anger’ twice in the past 65 years, but perhaps the question answers itself? The effects of a Hydrogen weapon being so devastatingly horrendous and unacceptable to any nation state, there has been a de facto protocol of ‘I won’t use them if you won’t’. Leading , in due course, to the evolution of the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction – MAD – and to even threaten their first use is to attract universal condemnation and pariah status. None of which, of course, applies to terrorists. So states appear to fall into four basic categories: those that are totally non-aligned and non-nuclear, those that are non-aligned but have developed or are developing a nuclear capability (Russia, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Iran), those that are part of an alliance who accept the protection of nuclear armed allies (NATO), and, those that are part of an alliance and offer protection under their own nuclear umbrella, (USA, France and UK).
The UK has an established nuclear deterrent having purchased the US ’Trident’ II D5 submarine launched system, operated from 4 Vanguard class vessels. These replaced the Polaris system in 1994 which in turn replaced the RAF Blue Steel air delivered system in 1970 (the WE.177 free fall nuclear device was withdrawn from RAF service in 1998). However, UK has a self-imposed limit of 48 warheads per operational submarine which is insignificant when the much larger stockpiles of warheads held by Russia and the USA are considered. According to the Federation of American Scientists, in 2010 the status of world nuclear forces was estimated at some 22375 warheads in-use or stockpiled worldwide, being: Russia 12000 (4650 in-use), USA 9400 (2626), France 300 (300), China 240 (180), UK 185 (160), Israel 80 (unknown), India 80 (unknown), Pakistan 80 (unknown), North Korea 10 (unknown). Which brings us to somewhere between 7916 to 8166 warheads being in-use.
Therefore, the case for UK offering up part or all of its nuclear weapons capability in the cause of ‘Strategic Arms Reductions’ is flawed at best, and, until major reductions have actually been carried out by Russia and the USA, a pointless gesture. Indeed, Russia and China are potential resource competitors, North Korea is an unpredictable and unstable state, and if Pakistan fell to the Taliban, it could, this scenario, become an anti-western nuclear-armed Islamic power, ahead even of Iran.
Therefore, for the UK, the nuclear deterrent is not just an established defence capability but an integrated foreign and defence insurance policy too. If abandoned would the UK become a non-nuclear member of NATO, protected under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter, or a non-nuclear, completely non-aligned country? As it is doubtful that any established politician in the UK would seriously advocate leaving NATO, this suggests that the UK would find itself living under the nuclear umbrella of the USA and/or France, losing its influence on the UN Security Council (the ability to punch above our weight argument) and exposing the inherent weakness of our conventional military position. For these reasons the UK should retain its deterrent. To do so will provide the UK with military independence not achievable through costly conventional forces alone – forces we show no realistic sign of equipping ourselves with. Indeed, British possession of a nuclear arsenal demonstrates all too clearly the diplomatic advantages that go with such status, and goes some distance to explaining why other states are so very keen to acquire such enhanced leverage for themselves.
However, the nature of the nuclear weapon takes it beyond normal procurement parameters and moves the decision making process away from the MOD, and intrinsic military criteria, and squarely into the hands of the foreign policy and fiscal establishment. Since the nuclear deterrent is not a military weapon at all, but, being a weapon of last resort, solely conceived of, in our possession of it, as a means to ensure national survival in the event of ultimate catastrophe, it’s surely entirely legitimate to regard it as quintessentially being a political weapon. And one, moreover, which should be uniquely funded from central funds, and not out of the straightforward defence vote. Though however it is funded, once the decision to have a nuclear deterrent has been taken, the type of delivery system then becomes the meat of day-to-day political debate.
Where the type of delivery system can affect the geo-political dynamic is in relation to range rather than yield or simple possession, for without the ability to accurately target world-wide locations the weapon system begins to lose its international deterrence and threat value, becoming instead localised and offering only regional or local deterrence value. Thus, North Korea, by test firing a longer range rocket system now has the undivided attention of the UN and the wider international community. For the UK, located in the upper latitudes of the Northern hemisphere, surrounded by friendly European nations, the need for a nuclear weapon delivery system that offers global reach and effect is key. We aren’t, whatever Sir Humphrey said, about to nuke France.
Currently, none of the RAF’s front line combat aircraft are configured for or have sufficient endurance to fill this strategic requirement, nor (since the demise of WE.177) is there an air launched nuclear weapon in the UK’s inventory. For a modern air-launched system to be viable, it must be available 24/7, have built-in survivability and be capable of hitting targets up to 5000 miles away with complete accuracy and certainty. Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of an RAF answer to this complex set of parameters without an extremely expensive and long lead-time aircraft procurement project linked to some form of super-sonic Cruise Missile technology.
Land based missile silos in the UK were discounted decades ago for solid tactical reasons, and would anyway now be prohibitively expensive and problematic to construct, even assuming a planning regime could be conjured into existence that would legally permit their construction. Apart from simple Nimbyism, such sites would also inevitably become a magnet for loony protest groups, and present the same fixed target a pre-emptive strike that vitiated this option decades ago. Basing silos on one of the remaining overseas territories is most likely to be internationally unacceptable, whilst also being a major cost and security problem, requiring a joint garrison for protection and still offering a known fixed target for an enemy pre-emptive strike. Which leaves the sea launch option as the front runner – either a ship launched cruise missiles or a submarine launched system. The obvious disadvantages for any surface ship option is lack of stealth and the inability of surface vessels to travel any distance undetected or unsupported. Therefore, surface ships would prove extremely vulnerable, and, armed with cruise missiles, which are currently sub-sonic, less than ideal in a deterrent or retaliatory role.
The problem with current cruise missile technology is that it is range limited and low level sub-sonic. Given that the likely targets are dispersed worldwide, the range issue immediately becomes apparent and air defence systems which can detect and destroy low level sub-sonic targets already exist. The Tomahawk, with a range of only circa 1500 to 1800 miles, severely restricts where a submarine can operate in order to be of immediate use and increases the numbers of submarines required on station if immediate global reach is to be maintained. These issues have to be addressed if current cruise missile technology or an upgraded system is seriously to be canvassed as something that might provide a long-term platform for a successor to Trident.
All of which leaves Trident with all its original merits still firmly intact. It’s a proven technology for which training, operational expertise and support is already in place. Ballistic submarines have demonstrable stealth characteristics, can transit to and from a firing zone without detection, remain on station far longer than any surface vessel, and carry 48 independently targeted warheads, with (politically and militarily) flexible yields of between 10 and 100 kilo-tons. More than enough to inflict extensive and unacceptable damage to any potential adversary, providing the First Sea Lord’s advice is headed and a 4 boat fleet is maintained. A 3 boat fleet cannot guarantee 365 day cover, and without that the deterrent will become practically and doctrinally moot.
It has been suggested that the decision to build a new class of submarine is maybe premature and that £5bn could be saved by engine refurbishment of the Vanguard boats, and delaying the replacement programme for up to 5 years. However, should the project go ahead as planned, the costs of a 4 boat replacement with improved missile system are estimated to be in the order of £17-21bn, with the new boats costing somewhere between £2.75bn and £3.5bn each. Within the costs of the Trident programme are elements for the warheads which are maintained and assembled at AWRE Aldermaston and these would be incurred whatever system is procured. Some political commentators have recently estimated the total cost of a replacement Trident system to be in the order of £100bn. This figure does not accord with current estimates which indicate a procurement cost of circa £20bn and through life costs of £45bn over 30 years - a total of £65bn. Mrs Thatcher’s government took a brave decision to ensure that Chevaline would be succeeded by Trident. We can but hope that the next government will be equally brave, if Britain is to maintain the military-diplomatic status she needs and deserves.
Sqn Ldr Dave Tisdale speaks on RAF matters for the UKNDA.